University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2007

Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens: Parental
Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted Diseases
Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Thomas Stratmann
George Mason University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Community Health and Preventive Medicine Commons, Family Law Commons, Gender and
Sexuality Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Medicine and Health Commons, and the Sexuality and
the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Klick, Jonathan and Stratmann, Thomas, "Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens: Parental
Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted Diseases" (2007). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 496.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/496

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

2 JLEO, V24 N1

Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens:
Parental Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted
Diseases
Jonathan Klick*
Florida State University
Thomas Stratmann**
George Mason University

Laws requiring minors to seek parental consent or to notify a parent prior to
obtaining an abortion raise the cost of risky sex for teenagers. Assuming choices
to engage in risky sex are made rationally, parental involvement laws should
lead to less risky sex among teens, either because of a reduction of sexual activity altogether or because teens will be more fastidious in the use of birth control ex ante. Using gonorrhea rates among older women to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across states, our results indicate that the enactment
of parental involvement laws signiﬁcantly reduces risky sexual activity among
teenage girls. We estimate reductions in gonorrhea rates of 20% for Hispanics
and 12% for whites. Although we ﬁnd a relatively small reduction in rates for
black girls, it is not statistically signiﬁcant. We speculate that the racial heterogeneity has to do with differences in family structure across races.

1. Introduction
Teenage sex is often described in visceral or emotional terms, with reason and
calculation playing little or no part in the decision to engage in sexual activity.
Even some social scientists argue that the rational choice model inadequately
describes sexual behavior among teens (e.g., Loewenstein 1996).
It is not surprising then that most of the discussion concerning laws that
require a minor to obtain her parent’s consent or, at least, to inform one of
her parents that she plans to get an abortion centers on issues arising after
the teen has engaged in risky sex. Supporters of these laws focus on parents’
right to know about or directly inﬂuence their child’s health-care decisions.
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Many supporters explicitly embrace the laws as part of an antiabortion
agenda.
Opponents, on the other hand, frame their arguments in terms of the teenagers’ rights. Also, a common rhetorical argument against the laws involves
the suggestion that if teens are not responsible enough to decide for themselves
whether or not to get an abortion, they are certainly not responsible enough to
take care of a child (e.g., Schrag 2005).
However, it is possible that passage of parental involvement laws will affect
the incentives teenagers face, inducing them to engage in less risky sex which
would decrease the demand for abortion without increasing the incidence of
teen motherhood. That is, if teens implicitly view abortion as a form of birth
control, increasing the psychic costs of obtaining an abortion through parental
involvement laws may induce teens to substitute toward other forms of birth
control such as condoms, birth control pills, or abstaining from sex altogether.
For this substitution effect to occur, however, teens must be forward looking in
their decision-making process regarding their sexual activities, and parental
involvement must represent a nontrivial increase in the total cost faced by
a teen when obtaining an abortion.
We examine the effect of parental involvement laws on the decision to engage in risky sex using Centers for Disease Control (CDC) data on the incidence of gonorrhea among teenage girls. Using gonorrhea rates among adult
women to control for contemporaneous variation in unobservable characteristics of the state population, we ﬁnd that parental involvement laws reduce
teen gonorrhea rates by 20% for Hispanics and 12% for white teens. The
effects are smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant for young black women.
The results are robust to a wide range of empirical speciﬁcations. These results
suggest that parental involvement laws reduce risky sexual behavior among
teens as predicted by a model in which teens consider costs and beneﬁts when
deciding to engage in sexual activities.
In Section 2, we present the theoretical underpinnings of our inquiry, and in
Section 3, we discuss the existing studies of the effects of parental involvement
laws. Section 4 describes our data and identiﬁcation strategy, and results are
provided in Section 5.
2. Teenage Sex and Incentives
As described in Klick and Stratmann (2003) and Levine and Staiger (2004)
abortion effectively serves an insurance function. That is, if unintended pregnancy is viewed as a risk of sex, having the option to abort the pregnancy lowers the cost of engaging in the sex. Further, in the decision to use some kind of
ex ante birth control, such as condoms or birth control pills, the abortion option
lowers the marginal beneﬁt of contraception. Thus, if individuals are forward
looking when making decisions regarding their sexual behavior, lowering the
cost of abortion through legalization, subsidization, or technological progress
that improves the safety of abortions will lead to an increase in risky sexual
activity, on the margin, as individuals both have more sex and substitute away
from ex ante birth control measures.
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Levine and Staiger (2004) present evidence in support of this incentive effect
of abortion availability using changes in abortion laws in Eastern Europe to
identify the effect. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that the pregnancy rate rises by about
25% when countries switched from laws that allowed abortion only when some
medical or social hardship could be documented (e.g., carrying pregnancy to
term would threaten the mother’s life) to an abortion upon request system,
relative to other countries that did not change their abortion laws at the same
time.
There is some concern that the presence of illegal abortions might be driving
this result. That is, under the more restrictive abortion policy, perhaps women
simply procured illegal abortions. Pregnancies resolved in this manner would
not show up in the pregnancy rate data, which is calculated as the number of
abortions plus the number of live births per 1000 women aged 15–44. If there
are a large number of illegal abortions in countries which restrict access to
abortion to only those cases where the mother’s health is in danger, switching
to an on-demand system would generate a spurious incentive effect as previously unobserved abortions would now appear in the ofﬁcial pregnancy rate
even in the absence of any change in underlying behavior.
To mitigate this concern, Levine and Staiger (2004) also examine the effect of
changing abortion access on the death rates of females aged 15–44 relative to
males of the same age cohort. Assuming that illegal abortions tend to be less safe,
if the switch from restricted abortion availability to on-demand abortion simply
substituted safer abortions for unsafe abortions that would have been obtained
illegally, there should have been a decrease in the female death rate. However,
Levine and Staiger (2004) ﬁnd no such increase, lending support to the incentive
explanation for their pregnancy rate ﬁnding. However, it should be noted that
death is a fairly rare outcome even in illegal abortions, so this test may not be very
powerful in detecting any substitution between illegal and legal abortions.
Klick and Stratmann (2003) attempt to avoid the data problem illegal abortions represent in examining pregnancy rates by focusing on the incidence of
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) as a proxy for the incidence of risky
sex (Klick 2004). That is, since more sex in the aggregate and the substitution
toward sex without a condom will both lead to an increase in STDs, increasing
abortion access will lead to an increase in STD incidence if individuals are forward looking in their decision to engage in risky sex. Klick and Stratmann (2003)
examine the ‘‘double experiment’’ provided by US abortion policy to examine
this link. They ﬁnd that when Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York, and
Washington legalized abortion on demand in the period 1969–1970, the gonorrhea and syphilis rates in those states rose signiﬁcantly compared to the rest of the
country. When the Supreme Court legalized abortion on demand nationwide in
1973, the STD gap between the early legalizers and other states disappeared.
Both studies, however, rely on aggregate data that do not allow the researchers to focus on teens speciﬁcally. It may be the case, in both instances, that
support for the abortion as insurance model is driven by changes in the behavior of older individuals. If teens do not engage in rational calculation in their
sex decisions, as suggested by Loewenstein (1996), because their behavior is
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determined almost entirely by biological forces or social construction1 or because they place excessive weight on the immediate beneﬁts of sex while
highly discounting the future costs (Loewenstein and Furstenberg 1991), then
abortion access will not affect the sexual behavior of teens.
In addition to providing some insights into the potential differences between
youth and adult decision-making processes, examining how teens react to
changes in abortion access has practical implications as well. If the Klick
and Stratmann (2003) results hold for teens, it would be useful for epidemiologists to explicitly model changes in abortion access in their models of the
spread of STDs among teens.2 Further, such evidence might play a role in evaluating the welfare effects of abortion policies aimed at teens. More generally,
the sensitivity of teens to the costs and beneﬁts of sex is important for predicting the efﬁcacy of any social policy meant to affect teen sexual behavior.3
In the context of laws requiring a young woman below the age of 18 to inform a parent or guardian about her decision prior to obtaining an abortion and
laws requiring parental consent, the psychic costs of obtaining an abortion are
raised if (1) the young woman’s parents are unaware of the extent of her sexual
activity, assuming the young woman expects them to be disapproving of such
behavior, and/or (2) the young woman’s parents are opposed to abortion morally (or she believes they are).
In the former case, requiring the young woman to inform her parents before
getting an abortion prohibits her from concealing the pregnancy, which is proof
of her behavior, from her parents. In the latter case, under a parental consent
law, acquiring consent will be relatively difﬁcult or, perhaps, impossible. In this
regard, even under a notiﬁcation law, there is likely to be some psychic cost to
the young woman to the extent that her parents’ feelings affect her own utility.
There is likely to be signiﬁcant heterogeneity across groups with respect to
these issues. For example, a young Catholic woman from a close family might
be more likely to want to conceal her sexual behavior from her parents and she
might suffer more anguish because her parents know she is having an abortion
compared with a nonreligious young woman from a broken home.
3. Prior Studies of Parental Involvement Laws
Levine (2003) studies the effect of parental involvement laws on teen behavior
by again focusing on pregnancy rates, abortion rates, and birth rates among 15to 17-year-olds as compared to women from older cohorts. He ﬁnds that the
adoption of a parental involvement law, controlling for state and year effects,
state-speciﬁc trends, and a host of other variables, leads to a statistically
1. Baumeister and Vohs (2004) suggest that these two perspectives have dominated the ﬁeld of
sexuality.
2. Weinstock et al. (2004) report that nearly half the newly reported STD infections in the
United States each year are found among individuals in the 15–24 age range.
3. For example, Ayres and Baker (2005) suggest that criminalizing reckless sex (deﬁned as
having sex without a condom during one’s ﬁrst sexual experience with a particular person) would
likely reduce both STD incidence and acquaintance rape. As they note, the beneﬁts of such a law
would be especially signiﬁcant for teenage girls.
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signiﬁcant decline in the abortion rate for the affected age-group but not for the
age-groups that were not affected by the laws. His results for pregnancy and
birth rates are more mixed with statistical signiﬁcance in the estimates for the
affected age-group depending on whether or not state-speciﬁc trends were included and what years of data were used to estimate the regressions; however,
the signs of the coefﬁcients in all the regressions, as well as the relative magnitudes of the coefﬁcients in the 15- to 17-year-olds’ regressions relative to the
other age cohorts, are consistent with the hypothesis that parental involvement
laws reduce risky sex among minors.
As in Levine and Staiger (2004), this study is neither able to rule out the
possibility that teens substitute toward illegal or informal abortions when involvement laws go into effect nor able to rule out the possibility that teens
obtain abortions out of state. Any of these possibilities could be driving
the Levine results, in addition to the changing incentives hypothesis.
Levine (2004) is also able to examine whether the reduction in risky sex
comes about because of an increase in the use of birth control or because
of a reduction in sexual activity altogether. Using responses from the 1988
and 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, Levine ﬁnds that the adoption
of parental involvement laws is associated with a reduction in the probability
that a respondent in the 15- to 18-year age-group indicated that she had engaged in unprotected sexual activity. His results suggest that this reduction was
driven by a reduction in individuals indicating they had failed to use contraception during the last time they had sexual intercourse, as opposed to not
engaging in intercourse at all.
Tomal (1999) studied the effects of parental consent and notiﬁcation laws
separately. She ﬁnds that both kinds of involvement laws are associated with
signiﬁcantly higher birth rates and signiﬁcantly lower abortion rates for both
affected and unaffected teens, suggesting that there are important temporal
effects that inhibit the isolation of the incentive effect of involvement laws
on teens. For example, it could be the case that the adoption of parental involvement laws reﬂects an underlying antiabortion sentiment in the state that
could make abortion relatively more costly for all individuals, regardless of
whether the laws apply to them or not. The passage of such laws could track
antiabortion protests that have the effect of driving abortion providers out of
the state. Failure to control for these temporal effects could generate spurious
correlations with the passage of involvement laws.
Bitler and Zavodny (2001) present results suggesting that parental involvement laws reduce the number of ﬁrst-trimester abortions, leading to an increase
in the proportion of abortions which take place after the ﬁrst trimester. Their
results in this regard are sensitive to whether or not they correct for autocorrelation. Medoff (1999) ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant effect of involvement
laws on state abortion rates (i.e., not broken down by trimester).
Joyce and Kaestner (1996) examine data from South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia, ﬁnding an effect of parental consent laws only in the case of South
Carolina for nonblack minors on the order of a 10% reduction in the likelihood
of obtaining an abortion. On the whole, they conclude that the effect of parental
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consent laws is small. This conclusion conﬂicts with those of Haas-Wilson
(1996), who found that parental involvement laws were associated with a large
decrease in the abortion rate for minors.
Interestingly, in a more recent article examining the experience of Texas
whose parental notiﬁcation law went into effect in 2000, Joyce et al.
(2006) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect on the abortion rates of those women covered
by the law relative to 18-year-old women.
4. Gonorrhea Rates as a Proxy for Risky Sexual Behavior
Interestingly, by focusing on pregnancy rates and abortion rates as the dependent variable, all the studies discussed in Section 3 suffer from an inability to
deal with the problem of illegal abortions. Again, if parental involvement laws
simply push minors into obtaining illegal abortions, the estimates described
above could simply involve spurious correlations as illegal or informal
(e.g., inﬂicting damage to the young woman’s abdomen in hopes of generating
a miscarriage) abortions drop out of the abortion rate and pregnancy rate data.
Although the Levine and Staiger (2002) analysis of female death rates cuts
against this possibility, they cannot rule it out if death from illegal and informal
abortions is fairly rare.
To avoid this problem, we adopt the strategy originated in Klick and Stratmann (2003) of focusing on STD rates as our measure of risky sexual behavior.
Speciﬁcally, we use the incidence of gonorrhea among women under the age of
20 as our proxy for risky sex. The choice of gonorrhea is driven by a handful of
factors. First, along with syphilis and chlamydia, gonorrhea is the only STD for
which the CDC has consistent data by age-group and by race. Gonorrhea has
a very short incubation period, is easily cured, and, other than mother-to-infant
infections, is only transmitted by sexual intercourse (Sen 2003).
We avoided using chlamydia because the data are only available after 1996,
which would not allow us to exploit many of the parental involvement
law changes. Syphilis also was rejected, given some of the peculiar characteristics of the disease that make it unattractive for our purposes. Speciﬁcally,
syphilis has largely been eradicated among women with much of the disease’s
incidence occurring among the homosexual male population for whom
pregnancy concerns are not a cost of risky sex (Klick and Stratmann 2003).
The dependent variable we focus on then is the number of female gonorrhea
cases per 100,000 female population in a state in the under-20 age category for
the years 1981 through 1998. Although this ‘‘treatment group’’ is slightly overinclusive with respect to the parental involvement laws, which apply to individuals under 18 years of age, the data do not allow us to examine gonorrhea
rates for only those under 18. Inclusion of 18- and 19-year-olds will serve to bias
any estimate of the causal effect of parental involvement laws toward zero. We
perform separate regressions for Hispanic teenagers, black teenagers, and white
teenagers since the underlying gonorrhea rates differ substantially by race.
Our parental involvement law variable comes from Bitler and Zavodny
(2001) and equals 1 for a year in which the state had either a parental notiﬁcation or consent law in effect for the entire year. For years in which a state
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adopted or got rid of such a law, the variable measures the fraction of the year
during which the law was in effect. All other state–year combinations take the
value of 0.4
To control for unobservable effects, we include the gonorrhea rate among
women in the 20 and older age-group. Although it is possible that there could
be cross-group infections which would contaminate our control group, any
such cross-group effects will bias our estimate of the effect of involvement
laws on the under-20 gonorrhea rate toward zero. We are essentially implementing the speciﬁcation Levine and Staiger (2002) used to examine the effect
of abortion laws on female death rates.5 We also control for time-invariant
state effects and year effects that are common to all states as well as state-speciﬁc trends. Descriptive statistics by race are presented in Table 1.
The regressions we run take the following form, where s denotes the state,
t denotes the year, and ðs  tÞ captures the state-speciﬁc trends with a denoting
the age-group (under 20; 20 and older):
ratestaunder20 ¼ a  lawst þ b  ratesta20þ þ ks þ st þ H  ðss  tÞ;
where the regressions are run separately by race and are weighted by the relevant race’s population of women under the age of 20.6
5. Is Teen Sexual Behavior Sensitive to Incentives?
We present the results of our analysis in Table 2. In addition to the statespeciﬁc trend speciﬁcation laid out above, we also present results when we drop
state trends.7 Further, given the concerns raised by Bertrand et al. (2004) about
serial correlation in difference-in-difference studies, we present three sets of
standard errors (SEs) for each coefﬁcient. In addition to robust SEs, which
allow for heteroskedasticity, we implement two of the serial correlation
remedies suggested by Bertrand et al. In the ﬁrst, we calculate the Newey–West
Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent estimator of the SEs, choosing
the potential lag structure optimally, as described in Stock and Watson
(2003:505–506). We also present SEs clustered by state.
4. Bitler and Zavodny construct their data from Merz et al. (1995) and Blank et al. (1996),
updating subsequent years with data from NARAL and the Alan Guttmacher Institute.
5. The duplication is not exact. Levine and Staiger (2002) regressed ln(female death rate/male
death rate) on a vector of explanatory variables X, which is equivalent to regressing ln(female death
rate) on vector X with the addition of ln(male death rate) as an explanatory variable. The results we
present in Section 5 are robust to regressing ln(under-20 gonorrhea rate) on the involvement law
variable and ln(20 and over gonorrhea rate) with state- and year-ﬁxed effects and state-speciﬁc
trends. We chose to present the nonlogged speciﬁcation since there are many observations with
a 0 under-20 gonorrhea rate which would be lost in the log speciﬁcation.
6. The results that follow are effectively unchanged if we also include a number of state-level
covariates, such as per capita income, education levels, religious composition, and so on. Since we
include gonorrhea rates for women 20 years and older, any generic effect of these state-level covariates should be controlled through their effect on adult gonorrhea rates.
7. We also examined speciﬁcations including state-speciﬁc quadratic and cubic trends. These
speciﬁcations generated results almost identical to those presented for the state-speciﬁc linear trend
case. These results are available upon request.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Involvement Law

Consent Law

Enjoined Law

Hispanic (female)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Gonorrhea rate20þ

Hispanic (male)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Black (female)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Black (male)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
White (female)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Description
Percent of year state enforced a parental
notiﬁcation or consent law regarding
abortions for minors
Percent of year state had a parental
consent law in place regarding
abortions for minors
Percent of year state had a parental
involvement law in place but its
enforcement was enjoined by court
action or it was effectively enjoined by
a state attorney general’s public
decision not to enforce the law

Mean

SD

0.280

0.439

0.175

0.374

0.197

0.389

Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic women below the age of 20
per 100,000 Hispanic women under
the age of 20 in the state
Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic women 20 or older per
100,000 Hispanic women 20 or older
in the state

57.402

65.774

64.099

83.249

Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic men below the age of 20 per
100,000 Hispanic men under the age
of 20 in the state
Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic men 20 or older per 100,000
Hispanic men 20 or older in the state

42.945

57.731

123.554

181.157

Number of gonorrhea cases among black
women below the age of 20 per
100,000 black women under the age
of 20 in the state
Number of gonorrhea cases among black
women 20 or older per 100,000 black
women 20 or older in the state

927.223

694.490

772.665

602.098

Number of gonorrhea cases among black
men below the age of 20 per 100,000
black men under the age of 20 in the state
Number of gonorrhea cases among black
men or older per 100,000 black men 20 or
older in the state

748.087

642.344

1686.458

1308.767

80.194

87.968

Number of gonorrhea cases among
white women below the age of 20 per
100,000 white women under the age of
20 in the state

Continued
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Table 1. Continued
Variable
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
White (male)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Gonorrhea
rate20þ

Description

Mean

SD

Number of gonorrhea cases among white
women 20 or older per 100,000 white
women 20 or older in the state

47.432

56.007

Number of gonorrhea cases among white
men below the age of 20 per 100,000
white men under the age of 20 in the state
Number of gonorrhea cases among white
men 20 or older per 100,000 white men
20 or older in the state

31.406

64.709

74.929

162.125

Involvement Law data come from Bitler and Zavodny (1999), and the gonorrhea data were generated by the CDC,
Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases.

For all races and for all speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that the effect of parental
involvement laws on gonorrhea rates for women under the age of 20 is negative. However, none of the speciﬁcations for black gonorrhea rates generates
a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the parental involvement law. For each
of the speciﬁcations for Hispanic and white gonorrhea rates that include statespeciﬁc trends (including those with quadratic or cubic state-speciﬁc trends
which are not reported here), there is a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect
of parental involvement laws on female teen gonorrhea rates. For each race, the
coefﬁcient’s magnitude is larger when state trends are included, suggesting
Table 2. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
per 100,000 Population

Involvement law

Gonorrhea rate20þ

State effects
Year effects
State trends
Observations
R2

Gonorrhea
Hispanic rateunder 20

Black

Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

White

Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

–4.905
–12.048
(4.306)
(5.801)**
[5.001]
[5.560]**
{6.350}
{5.648}**
0.560
0.536
(0.025)*** (0.038)***
[0.028]*** [0.039]***
{0.034}*** {0.047}***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
None
Linear
911
911
0.920
0.938

–36.610
(35.041)
[43.618]
{57.081}
0.971
(0.043)***
[0.050]***
[0.068}***
Yes
Yes
None
912
0.938

–40.723
(40.497)
(47.239)
{69.777}
0.930
(0.056)***
[0.062]***
{0.080}***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.947

–0.816
(2.473)
[3.247]
{4.814}
1.415
(0.043)***
[0.053]***
{0.083}***
Yes
Yes
None
912
0.945

–9.541
(2.765)***
[3.130]***
{5.309}*
1.407
(0.068)***
[0.077]***
{0.125}***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.962

Robust SEs are given in parentheses; Newey–West Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) SEs are given in
brackets; and SEs clustered by state are given in curly brackets. All regressions were weighted using the population of
females under the age of 20 of the given race for each state. For the Newey–West HAC estimators of the SEs, we chose
the lag structure optimally as discussed in Stock and Watson (2003:505–506).
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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that involvement laws tend to be adopted as teen gonorrhea rates are already
trending downward. Thus, inclusion of state trends may help to mitigate any
potential simultaneity bias.
For young Hispanic women, parental involvement laws are associated with
a decline of 12 cases of gonorrhea per 100,000 population. This effect is both
statistically signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0.038) and of practical importance as it represents
a decline of about 21% relative to the average Hispanic teen female gonorrhea
rate. The effect for young white women, a reduction of 9.5 cases per 100,000
population) is also statistically signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0.001) and represents a decline
of about 12% relative to the average rate. The statistical signiﬁcance of these
effects is robust to the various SE calculations. We also employed the Arellano–Bond (1991) estimator to explicitly model the potentially dynamic causal
effect, allowing for up to a 2-year distributed lag, and the results were essentially
the same (not reported).8 Although the effect among young black women generates the coefﬁcient with the largest magnitude (41), it is not statistically signiﬁcant and the relative effect is fairly small, representing a reduction of only 4%.
For all races, the rate of gonorrhea among women 20 and older is positively
and signiﬁcantly related to the under-20 gonorrhea rate. The regressions all
explain more than 93% of the variation in the data.
5.1 More General Time Effect

As a robustness check on our Table 2 results, we also estimated models allowing for more general time effects. Speciﬁcally, in the difference-in-difference
model presented above, we are only able to estimate time-invariant state
effects. However, if unobservable state characteristics are changing over time
and those effects are related to the passage of parental involvement laws, our
results will suffer from an omitted-variables bias. For example, if views about
abortion among a state’s residents are changing over time, we may ﬁnd that
increasing social conservatism has both an effect on sexual behavior (e.g., less
premarital sex, more monogamy, etc.) and the adoption of public policy (e.g.,
parental involvement laws). This simultaneity would generate a positive association between abortion laws and gonorrhea rates even if there is no true
effect of parental involvement laws on teenage sexual behavior.
Arguably, controlling for the gonorrhea rates of those aged 20 and older mitigates this concern to some degree, as social pressures affecting teens would likely
affect older women as well. However, in the speciﬁcations provided in Table 2,
we pool the relationship between teen gonorrhea rates and adult gonorrhea rates in
one coefﬁcient that is common to all states and years. A more general model
would allow for these social effects to differ by state, as well as over time.
To allow for this generality, we present a difference-in-difference-indifference (DDD) model which uses the adult gonorrhea rates as a within-state
8. The xtabond routine in Stata does not allow for weights, so the resulting magnitudes are not
directly comparable in principle, though they differed very little in magnitude and did not differ at
all in sign or statistical signiﬁcance. The Arellano–Bond (1991) diagnostic statistic suggested that
the series exhibits a 1-year lag structure.
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control group for each observation of teenage female gonorrhea rates. That is,
we now estimate a regression that includes separate year effects for each state,
separate year effects for each age-group, as well as age-group–speciﬁc state
effects. We also allow for age-group–speciﬁc state trends. In this speciﬁcation,
we are identifying the effect of a parental involvement law by examining the
average change in the relationship between teen and adult gonorrhea rates before and after the adoption of the law, net of any contemporaneous changes in
the relationship in nonadopting states as well as any preexisting trends in the
relationship in adopting states.
More formally, we estimate:
ratesta ¼ a  lawsta þ ksa þ sta þ Tst þ H  ðssa  tÞ;
where lawsta takes the value of the percent of year t in which state s had a parental involvement law in place for the observations on teenage female gonorrhea rates and zero for all other observations (i.e., all adult female gonorrhea
rates and teenage female gonorrhea rates in states with no parental involvement law). ksa represents the time-invariant age-speciﬁc state-ﬁxed effects; sta
represents the age-group–speciﬁc year dummies that are common to all states;
Tst represents the state-speciﬁc year dummies; the last term represents the agegroup–speciﬁc and state-speciﬁc trends.
We present the results from this DDD speciﬁcation in Table 3. Once again, we
ﬁnd that all races exhibit a negative effect of parental involvement laws on teenage female gonorrhea rates. Again, the results are not statistically signiﬁcant for
black women, even though the magnitude of the effect is the largest for this race.
For Hispanics and whites, statistical signiﬁcance is sensitive to the time trend
included, with the Hispanic coefﬁcient being signiﬁcant in the no-trend model,
but not the others, whereas the white coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant in all the trend
models (including the quadratic- and cubic-trend models not presented here).
For our purposes, it is most important to note that time-varying unobserved state
effects do not appear to be biasing the difference-in-difference results presented
in Table 2, since the more general DDD speciﬁcations of Table 3 generate coefﬁcients that are generally as large or larger than the Table 2 results.9

9. Parallel work by Dee and Sen (2006) ﬁnds no effect of parental involvement laws on teen
gonorrhea rates in a triple-differences framework. This difference arises primarily because they do
not include age-speciﬁc state trends in their triple-difference speciﬁcations (and they do not examine rates among Hispanics). They also raise some concerns regarding the use of weighted least
squares (WLS), suggesting that weighting might be improper in this context since the magnitude of
the point estimates differs between the ordinary least squares (OLS) and WLS speciﬁcations by
more than 50%. Interestingly, in the speciﬁcations with age-group–speciﬁc state trends, the difference in point estimates between the OLS and WLS triple-difference speciﬁcations is much
smaller, mitigating their concerns about weighting. On the arguments for using WLS in this context, see Greene (2000) and Wooldridge (2003), who argue that WLS provides greater efﬁciency in
some contexts. Speciﬁcally, when using rates as the dependent variable, states with larger populations are likely to have lower error variance in their rates. It is also arguable, from a practical
standpoint, that when estimating average treatment effects on incidence rates, weighted estimators
are more relevant, given the large differences in state populations.

–9.490 (7.608)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Linear
2027
0.983

–37.057 (5.764)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
None
2027
0.972

Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

2028
0.986

–32.016 (33.386)
Yes
Yes
Yes
None

Black

2028
0.987

–27.865 (42.451)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Linear

Gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Robust SEs are given in parentheses. All regressions were weighted using the relevant population of females of the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Involvement law  under 20
Age-group  state effects
Age-group  year effects
State  year effects
Age-group–speciﬁc state
trends
Observations
R2

Hispanic

Table 3. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates per 100,000 Population

2028
0.978

–2.582 (3.865)
Yes
Yes
Yes
None

White

2028
0.987

–13.457 (4.020)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Linear

Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
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Table 4. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
per 100,000 Population Effect of Enjoining Parental Involvement Laws

Involvement law
Enjoined law
Gonorrhea rate20þ
State effects
Year effects
State trends
Observations
R2

Hispanic gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Black gonorrhea
rateunder 20

White gonorrhea
rateunder 20

–13.846 (5.988)**
–4.476 (3.038)
0.538 (0.038)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
911
0.939

–33.164 (43.059)
12.840 (37.972)
0.931 (0.056)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.947

–13.275 (3.545)***
–5.932 (2.867)**
1.404 (0.067)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.963

Robust SEs are given in parentheses. As above, all regressions are weighted using the population of females under the
age of 20 for the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

5.2 The Effects of Enjoining a Parental Involvement Law

Although the DDD results provide some comfort that our treatment effect is
not driven by time-varying unobservables, there is another test we can exploit
to examine the potential endogeneity of parental involvement laws. In a number of states, after the legislature passes an involvement law, state courts have
ruled the laws to be impermissible under the federal or state constitution,
enjoining their enforcement or the state attorney general has made a similar
decision, effectively enjoining the law due to its public decision not to enforce
the law. These decisions to enjoin the law will be largely orthogonal to underlying voter sentiment. Thus, if this sentiment is driving our treatment effect,
we should ﬁnd that the effect of enjoining the law has approximately the same
effect on gonorrhea rates as does the law’s passage.
On the other hand, if the effect is reduced, it suggests that the law itself,
independent of any underlying social pressures or attitudes, has an effect
on teenage sexual behavior through the channels discussed above. We likely
would not expect the effect to drop to zero if the law is enjoined for a few
reasons. First, the timing of the enjoinment is precise, whereas the gonorrhea
data are aggregated annually. Second, if teens are making decisions probabilistically, they will recognize the potentially temporary nature of enjoining the
law since a higher court may reverse the decision quickly or the legislature
may redraft the law to respond to the decision to enjoin the law.
In Table 4, we investigate this test, showing that the coefﬁcient on an enjoined
law is substantially lower than the effect of an enforced law. Speciﬁcally, for
Hispanics and whites, the enjoined law generates a coefﬁcient that is roughly
one-third as large as the coefﬁcient on the enforced law. The enjoined law coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant for Hispanics but it is for whites, though
the difference between the enforced law coefﬁcient and the enjoined law coefﬁcient for whites is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. For the regressions
examining black gonorrhea rates, we ﬁnd a positive coefﬁcient on the enjoined
laws, though it is not statistically signiﬁcant, perhaps further indicating the differing dynamics of black gonorrhea rates relative to the other races examined.
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Table 5. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
per 100,000 Population Notiﬁcation and Consent
Hispanic gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Involvement law
Consent law
Gonorrhea rate20þ
State effects
Year effects
State trends
Observations
R2

–12.957 (8.057)
2.094 (10.776)
0.536 (0.038)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
911
0.938

Black gonorrhea
rateunder 20

White gonorrhea
rateunder 20

–191.032 (63.869)***
217.381 (71.759)***
0.930 (0.056)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.947

–8.984 (3.621)***
-0.991 (5.591)
1.406 (0.068)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.962

Robust SEs are given in parentheses. As above, all regressions are weighted using the population of females under the
age of 20 for the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

5.3 Differences Across Categories of Laws

We have treated parental involvement laws generically until now. However,
there may be differences between notiﬁcation laws and consent laws. Effectively, both laws have a notiﬁcation component since it would not be possible
to obtain parental consent without simultaneously providing notiﬁcation.
However, consent laws may provide an additional deterrent if parents are
likely to stop their daughter from receiving an abortion.
To examine how much of the effect we identify is purely a notiﬁcation effect, we reran the Table 2 regressions adding a variable taking the value of the
percent of a year the state had a parental consent law in effect. Thus, our involvement law coefﬁcient will indicate the effect of the notiﬁcation requirement on behavior, whereas the consent coefﬁcient will indicate the marginal
effect from also requiring parental consent for abortion access.
As shown in Table 5, for both Hispanics and whites, we ﬁnd that all the
identiﬁed effect comes from the notiﬁcation requirement. For neither race
is the consent coefﬁcient statistically signiﬁcant. Once again, however, the
black regressions exhibit a different pattern. Although in these regressions
black female teen gonorrhea rates exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant decline
when notiﬁcation is required, they actually exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant
increase when consent is required. We have no intuition for this result, but
it does seem to further indicate that the dynamics of black gonorrhea rates
differ from those of Hispanics and whites.
5.4 Effects on Male Gonorrhea Rates

As one further robustness check on our results, we also examined the effect of
parental involvement laws on gonorrhea rates among teenage males. In principle, since it seems likely that most individuals have sexual relations within
their own peer group, if the posited causal mechanism is generating the results
presented above, we should ﬁnd a similar effect among males. If females are
deterred from having risky sex because of the parental involvement laws, their
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Table 6. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Male Teenage Gonorrhea Rates per
100,000 Population

Involvement law
Gonorrhea rate20þ
State effects
Year effects
State trends
Observations
R2

Hispanic gonorrhea
rateunder 20

Black gonorrhea
rateunder 20

White gonorrhea
rateunder 20

–7.670 (5.951)
0.238 (0.018)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
911
0.947

13.857 (35.129)
0.364 (0.015)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.941

–3.055 (1.946)
0.316 (0.022)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
912
0.933

Robust SEs are given in parentheses. As above, all regressions are weighted using the population of males under the
age of 20 for the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

male partners will also be limited in their opportunities for risky sex. However,
since the burden of the involvement laws will fall on teenage girls, we should
expect the effect to be mitigated for males, as they can always substitute toward having risky sex with older women who are unaffected by the laws. This
substitution strategy will not be available to female teens.
The results presented in Table 6 are consistent with this as we ﬁnd that both
Hispanic and white male teenage gonorrhea rates are negatively related to the
passage of a parental involvement law, though the effects are smaller than
those observed for female gonorrhea rates and they are not statistically significant. Once again, however, we ﬁnd black rates behaving differently, generating a positive coefﬁcient on the parental involvement laws, though it is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
The results in Tables 2–6 provide robust evidence of the incentive effect of
restricted abortion availability in teenagers’ decisions regarding risky sex, at
least for Hispanic and white teenage women. This suggests that Hispanic and
white teenage women are forward looking in their sex decisions, and they systematically view informing their parents and obtaining parental consent as additional costs in obtaining an abortion, inducing them to engage in less risky
sex when parental involvement laws are adopted. Unfortunately, the data do
not allow us to differentiate between the possibility that teens engage in less
sex and they simply have the same amount of sex but are more fastidious in
their condom use. Both these causal mechanisms would generate the results we
observe. Levine’s (2003) results would suggest that the latter mechanism is
driving our results, though we cannot rule out the possibility that both mechanisms are at work here.10 Along those lines, however, we can rule out the
10. To the extent that public opinion accurately reﬂects which causal mechanism is at work, in
an October 1989 poll printed in the Parents magazine, 62% of respondents indicated that they
thought laws restricting abortion access for teens would make teens at least somewhat more likely
to use contraception (compared to 35% who thought the laws would have no effect), whereas in the
same poll, only 16% of respondents indicated that these laws would induce teens to curtail their
sexual activity.
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possibility that teens simply substitute to risky sexual behaviors for which
pregnancy is not a concern, such as oral or anal intercourse since these sets
of behavior would also transmit gonorrhea. Further, more fastidious use of
birth control pills also would not generate the effect we identify.

6. Why Is There Racial Heterogeneity?
In addition to our Hispanic and white results collectively suggesting that teen
sexual behaviors respond to the additional costs generated by parental involvement laws, the black results collectively raise a puzzle. Not only do black gonorrhea rates exhibit the statistically signiﬁcant systematic decline when
parental involvement laws are adopted but also black male rates appear to rise
and female rates appear to rise in the presence of a consent law and when a notiﬁcation law is enjoined. The dynamics of gonorrhea rates among black teens
appear to differ from those among Hispanics and whites.
These differential results could lead to a number of different inferences, but
we are unable to choose among them on the basis of our analysis. Perhaps the
fact that black gonorrhea rates are so much higher in general makes a difference
in how much a behavioral change affects aggregate disease rates. Another possibility is that there is little cost involved with a young black woman informing
her parents about her pregnancy.11 Perhaps there is more communication about
sexual issues in black families, implying that the event of a pregnancy provides
little new information about a child’s sexual behavior. Also, perhaps black
parents are less likely to view abortion negatively. There is some evidence
on this point as some surveys indicate that black individuals are more likely
than white and Hispanic individuals to believe that abortion should be legal.12
The high proportion of Hispanics who are Catholic could help to explain the
relatively large effect of parental involvement laws on the behavior of Hispanic teens.
Even if none of those hypotheses is correct, it could be the case that black
teens experience less disutility than their Hispanic and white counterparts
when they disappoint their parents. Lastly, it could be the case that the relationships between black teens and their families does not systematically differ
from the relationships in Hispanic and white families, but black teens have
signiﬁcantly higher discount rates that cause them to discount the future costs
of sex (including parental disapproval) relatively more than teens from the
11. For example, Wells and Twenge (2005) ﬁnd that black teens are signiﬁcantly more likely to
be sexually active than are white and Hispanic teens. In their study, they found that 62% of black
teens were sexually active compared with only 40% of whites and 44% of Hispanics. Thus, it may
be the case that notifying a black parent that her daughter is seeking an abortion provides relatively
little new information about the daughter’s sexual behavior since it was more likely than not that
the daughter was sexually active. The same would not generally be true for white and Hispanic
daughters.
12. Ladd and Bowman (1999) report 1992 and 1996 survey results suggesting that 67% of
black individuals believed that abortion should be legal in most or all cases compared to 57%
of Hispanics and 64% of whites in 1992 and 58% of Hispanics and 58% of whites in 1996.
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other groups,13 or perhaps there is more across age-group sex among black
individuals than there is among Hispanic or white individuals.14
To get to the bottom of this heterogeneity, we examine the extent to which
family structure inﬂuences our results. Census data are potentially enlightening here. It is clear that Hispanic and white families in the United States look
very similar in terms of structure during the period we studied, at least relative
to black families. For example, using data from the Household and Family
Characteristics report that is part of the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey for the last year included in our study (1998),15 it would appear
that the percent of family households that are headed by a married couple is
much lower for blacks (47%) than it is for either Hispanics (69%) or whites
(81%). Excluding the Northeast, which has a relatively low percent of Hispanic family households headed by a married couple, the gap between blacks
and the other two groups is even bigger. Arguably, the cost borne by a teenager
for informing her parents about her sexual behavior will be higher in family
households that are intact.
Unfortunately, census does not report family structure data at the state level,
so it is not possible to control for family structure directly in our regressions.
However, if we allow for results to differ by region, we might be able to discern
whether the treatment effect of involvement laws differs in a way that makes
sense in light of what we know about differences in family structure across
regions. The most striking difference in family structure, as noted above, is
found in a comparison of Hispanic households in the Northeast with Hispanic
households in the rest of the country. In 1998, whereas the percent of Hispanic
family households headed by a married couple for the Northeast was only 52%,
in the Midwest, South, and West it was 73%, 74%, and 71%, respectively.
To analyze if these differences in Hispanic family structure lead to differences in treatment effects, we ran the regression from Table 2 above with three
different sets of treatment effects. First, we performed one speciﬁcation with
a separate treatment effect for each region. The second speciﬁcation allowed
for a common treatment effect for the Midwest, the South, and the West and
a separate treatment effect for the Northeast. Lastly, we estimated a regression
with one general treatment effect for all four regions and a separate treatment
effect for the Northeast. The results are presented in Table 7.
Our intuition about the effect of family structure appears to be consistent
with our estimates. In the regression with four separate treatment effects, although all are negative, the coefﬁcients for the Midwest, South, and West are
all about twice as large in magnitude as the coefﬁcient for the Northeast,
13. For some research regarding racial differences in discount rates, see Warner and Pleeter
(2001), whose research suggests that blacks individuals exhibit systematically higher subjective
discount rates compared to whites.
14. If there is signiﬁcantly more sex between adults and teens among black individuals, parental involvement laws might have a large negative effect on the gonorrhea rate found among our
contemporaneous control group, implicitly lowering the estimated treatment effect.
15. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last accessed
on 21 July 2006).
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Table 7. Regional Treatment Effects for Hispanics
Involvement law—Northeast
Involvement law—Midwest
Involvement law—South
Involvement law—West
Involvement law—Not NE
Involvement law
Gonorrhea rate20þ
State effects
Year effects
State trends
Observations

–6.516 (18.464)
–12.086 (8.969)
–15.345 (8.727)
–12.189 (11.885)
—
—
0.536 (0.038)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
911

–6.523 (18.442)
—
—
—
–12.929 (6.062)**
—
0.536 (0.038)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
911

6.407 (19.384)
—
—
—
—
–12.929 (6.062)**
0.536 (0.038)***
Yes
Yes
Linear
911

Robust SEs are given in parentheses. All regressions were weighted using the population of Hispanic females under the
age of 20 for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

though the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant owing to the large SEs. In
the speciﬁcation that pools the effects in the Midwest, South, and West allowing for a separate Northeast effect, we ﬁnd that the non-Northeast effect is
statistically signiﬁcant and it is twice as large as the treatment effect in the
Northeast, though the difference between the coefﬁcients is still not statistically signiﬁcant. Lastly, we ﬁnd the same basic result in the speciﬁcation that
allows for a generic effect for all regions plus an additional effect for the
Northeast, ﬁnding a statistically signiﬁcant negative generic treatment effect and a positive treatment effect for the Northeast that is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
These results may provide some general clues as to our failure to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant treatment effect for black teens, given that they are much
more likely to live in households where two parents are not present. However,
it is not possible to test this intuition in even the indirect way described above
since there are no stark differences in black family structure across regions.16

7. Conclusion
Incentives matter. They matter even in activities as primal as sex, and they matter even among teenagers, who are conventionally thought to be short-sighted.
If the expected costs of risky sex are raised, teens will substitute toward less
risky activities such as protected sex or abstinence. In addition to modeling the
decision-making processes of teenagers, this insight is important in other contexts as well. Many public policies can be improved by recognizing the sensitivity of teenage sexual decisions to costs and beneﬁts.
We study one set of policies in this article. We show that increasing the cost
of abortion for teens lowers the insurance value of abortion. This induces
16. For example, in 1998, the percent of black family households headed by a married couple
was 43, 45, 48, and 50, respectively, for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
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teenage girls to avoid risky sex, which will likely have the effect of lowering
pregnancy rates, abortion rates, and birth rates among this group of individuals.
Although these positive effects alone might not justify parental involvement
laws, they presumably should not be ignored in the debate.17 Behavior is not
static, and claims based on the assumption of static behavior are ﬂawed.
From a practical standpoint, this study reinforces the claim made in Klick
and Stratmann (2003) that epidemiologists could improve models of the spread
of STDs by incorporating the behavioral effects induced by changes in abortion access. However, those effects may differ by race, religion, or family
structure, and more research is needed to determine the relative contribution
of these factors to the behavioral effects of abortion access.
From an academic standpoint, our results support the conclusion reached in
Levine (2004) that teens do view abortion as pregnancy insurance and the enactment of parental involvement laws induces teens to substitute away from
risky sex. Although being consistent with the Levine results, by focusing on
gonorrhea rates instead of abortion and pregnancy rates, we avoid the data
problem posed by illegal, informal, and out-of-state abortions which limit conﬁdence in the earlier studies.
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